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Hypotheses  
1. Africa’s development is slow 
2. Africa is exceptional 
3. Family planning programs are lacking 
Outline 
1. Fertility and development trends 
• Levels 
• Pace 
2. African exceptionalism 
3. Impact of family planning programs 
4. Conclusions 
01
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1960 1980 2000 2020
Bi
rt
hs
 p
er
 w
om
an
 
Total fertility rate 
Africa 
 
 
 
Other 
LDCs 
 Development indicators 1970-2010 
 
- GDP per capita (at PPP) from the PWT 
 
- Education, % with primary + (Wittgenstein) 
 
- Life expectancy at birth (UN 2013) 
 
- Percent urban (UN 2014).  
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Africa 
  Average at the time of  
transition onset 
  Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Other LDCs 
TFR decline % 10 10 
Year of transition onset 1994 1975 
GDP/cap(log) 6.9 7.7 
Education (% primary+) 29 42 
Life expectancy 51 59 
Percent urban 29 40 
 Conclusions 
 
1) African transitions later in time 
 
          Consistent with conventional theory 
 
 
2) But early relative to level of development 
 
        Consistent with diffusion theories 
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Africa 
  Average pace at the time of 
transition onset 
  Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Other LDCs 
TFR 0.09 0.15 
Year 1994 1975 
GDP/cap(log) 0.008 0.034 
Education (% primary+) 1.2 2.0 
Life expectancy 0.12 0.47 
Percent urban 0.29 0.57 
 Conclusions 
 
3) African transitions are slow because the 
pace of development is slow  
 
          Consistent with conventional theory 
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TFR by life expectancy, 2010 
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TFR by percent urban, 2010 
Africa 
 
 
                Other    
 LDCs  
  TFR 
2010 
Africa effect 1.18** 
GDP/cap -0.36* 
Education -0.019*** 
Life expectancy -0.02 
Percent urban 0.00 
    
R2 0.84 
N 71 
Year 2010 
Socioeconomic dev. 
Mortality decline 
Cost and benefits of 
children 
Fertility preferences 
Demand for 
contraception 
Use of 
contraception 
Fertility 
  TFR Contraceptive 
prevalence 
Desired 
Family size 
Africa effect 1.18** -10.9* 1.24* 
GDP/cap (log) -0.36* 0.83 0.3 
Education -0.019*** 0.51*** -2.7*** 
Life expectancy -0.02 0.65 -0.04 
Percent urban 0.00 -0.15 0.01 
        
R2 0.84 0.86 0.72 
N 71 71 39 
Year 2010 2010 Latest DHS  
 Conclusions: 
 
African fertility is high relative to development 
 
           Consistent with theories about  
African exceptionalism (e.g. Caldwell) 
Caldwell (1992) : 
”(1) African traditional society stressed the importance of 
ancestry and descent. …younger generations assisted the older 
generations .. for males at least, high fertility ultimately 
brought substantial economic returns… 
 
 (2) Polygyny led in West and Middle Africa to separate spousal 
budgets. The father was spared much of the cost of rearing 
children.  
 
(3) There was strength and safety in numbers. Communal land 
tenure meant that large families could demand a greater share 
of the land… 
 
(4) Family planning programs were nonexistent or weak 
..regarded as foreign or as incompatible with African culture  
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Conclusion: 
 
1) High unmet need for contraception and 
large numbers of unplanned pregnancies 
2) Family planning programs can reduce 
fertility by about 1.5 births per woman 
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 Causes of slow fertility decline in Africa 
 
1) Slow pace of development 
2) African pro-natalism 
3) Weak or non-existent FP programs 
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